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Abstract 
Immigrant investor programmes (IIPs) have mushroomed around the world in 
recent years. Focusing on the EU context, where each Member State has at 
least one legal mechanism for granting residence or citizenship rights in 
exchange for investment, this paper has a twofold objective. First, it seeks to 
develop a typology of IIPs on the grounds of investment amounts and status 
obligations. Second, the paper applies this typology to map and examine 
immigrant investor programmes in the EU. Rather than looking in detail at the 
politics of investment-based migration in each country, this study identifies 
general conditions across states that enable different types of IIPs to develop. 
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Introduction 
Immigrant investor programmes (IIPs) are policies developed by countries seeking to 
attract the wealthy to become their residents or citizens. Historically, some form of an 
exchange between money and membership can be traced back to Ancient Rome 
(Džankić 2012). Yet, contemporary investment-based migration has laid its roots in 
the early 1980s, when the first wave of programmes though which the wealthy could 
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obtain new passports or residence cards emerged (GRIR 2016). In 1982, the 
government of Australia introduced its Business Migration Program (BMP) granting 
residence rights on the basis of investment (Stevens 2016). Between 1986 and 1993, 
the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand, Canada, Uruguay 
and Panama, amended their immigration policies along the same lines. The Caribbean 
islands of St. Kitts and Nevis and the Commonwealth of Dominica, and the African 
volcanic archipelago of Cape Verde developed programs though which investors 
could obtain passports (GRIR 2016). Other European countries, such as Austria or 
Ireland, used the state’s discretion to naturalize investors on grounds of 
“associations”, “achievements” or “exceptional contribution” (Džankić 2014; Carrera 
2014).  
Only a few immigrant investor schemes were set up in the early 2000s, 
including the Cypriot Naturalisation by Exception Program (2002), the ordinary 
residence for investors in Greece (2005), and the High Net Worth Residence in Malta 
(2006). The second wave of wealth-based immigration programs appeared in the 
aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, in island nations off the coast of 
Africa (Comoros, Mauritius), North America (Turks and Caicos, Antigua and 
Barbuda, St. Lucia) and in Oceania (Fiji, Vanuatu). It proliferated in the European 
Union (EU) during the peak of the Eurocrisis. Between 2011 and 2013, a number of 
European states have launched fresh immigrant investor programmes or revived those 
they had previously. Bulgaria, France, Hungary, 1 Ireland, Latvia, Spain, Portugal, and 
the Netherlands adopted residence by investment programmes. In 2013, Cyprus 
revised its investor citizenship programme and Malta introduced one. By 2016, each 
EU Member State has adopted at least one legal mechanism for facilitating 
investment-based migration, be it through the state’s discretion to naturalise, an 
investor citizenship scheme, or a programme granting ‘a path to citizenship’ via 
residence rights.  
 Against such a background, this article has two goals. The first objective is to 
develop a typology of IIPs, and identify environments conducive to different types of 
programmes . The second objective is to apply this typology and examine immigrant 
investor programmes in the EU. As a result of the particular legal and political 
architecture of the EU, citizenship and residence regimes of the 28 member states are 
interrelated. These two statuses give rise to different sets of rights across the Union. 
Hence, programmes offering ‘paths to citizenship’ via residence rights have target 
groups and beneficiaries different from those directly offering citizenship to 
investors.2  
 Unlike in other parts of the world, where investment-based citizenship 
programmes entitle their beneficiaries to visa-free travel, preferential tax rates, and 
protection abroad, in the EU, they are associated with an additional bundle of political 
rights. These rights emanate from the Citizenship of the European Union (EU 
citizenship), established in 1992 to define the rights of citizens of the member states 
across the Union. They include the freedom of movement and residence, the right to 
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, voting rights in municipal and European 
Parliament elections, consular protection by another EU country, etc. Importantly, EU 
Citizenship is additional to and dependent on national citizenship (article 20 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU). Hence the investor 
citizenship programmes in the EU target individuals who will make a single 
investment in one country’s economy, but who are primarily interested in additional 
opportunities that come from EU citizenship.  
 By contrast, residence rights are commonly limited to a single country, with 
some Union-wide rights arising from the common market. That is, residence in an EU 
member state does not immediately result in the freedom of movement across the 
Union or protection abroad. It can have a limited effect on the visa-free travel in the 
Schengen area (for stays in other member states of up to 90 days within 6 months). 
Furthermore, residence in the common market countries enhances possibilities for 
developing business. The free movement of capital implies that all transfers within the 
EU are treated as domestic and thus do not incur additional costs (Articles 63 to 66 of 
the TFEU).3 Therefore, the target group of programmes that offer residence rights to 
investors are migrants who will continuously engage in the respective countries’ 
economies through business opportunities of the common market.  
In terms of content and structure, this paper does not analyse the detailed 
politics of investment-based migration, or offer normative arguments for supporting 
or rejecting it. Rather, it develops a typology of immigrant investor programmes and 
identifies commonalities of environments in which citizenship and residence statuses 
are exchanged for money. The paper then applies this approach to study immigrant 
investor programmes in the EU. The conclusion to the paper clears the grounds for 
further normative and comparative studies of immigrant investor programmes and 
briefly discusses their implications beyond the EU context. 
 The study relies on individually collected data on legal provisions regulating 
immigrant investor programmes in 28 member states of the EU. Full texts of 
constitutions and most recent citizenship laws have been accessed through the EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory’s “National Citizenship Laws Database”. Residence-related 
legislation has been collected separately through research on each member state’s 
aliens acts and subsidiary legislation. It is supplemented by desk research on political 
and economic environments in countries operating IIPs. As the argument focuses on a 
comparison of legal provisions, interviews with stakeholders in each country go 
beyond the scope of this article.  
 
A typology of immigrant investor programmes 
 
Although the exchange of communal membership for a pecuniary contribution has 
deep historical roots, until recently, only a few academic sources have focused 
specifically on it. Rather, there has been some tangential discussion of this issue in the 
debates over the constitution of the demos, which highlighted the normative tensions 
inherent in the sale of citizenship (Buchanan 1965; Carens 1987; Walzer 1983). 
Studies that explored the historical developments of citizenship (Shachar 2000) 
viewed it as a part of broader trends of inclusion and exclusion. As the number of 
immigrant investor programmes has increased in recent years, literature on this topic 
has now grown to a handful of studies. Džankić (2014), Shachar and Hirschl (2014), 
Shachar and Bauböck (2014), Parker (2016), and Tanasoca (2015) explored the 
ethical dimensions of the link between citizenship and money highlighting the 
benefits of and controversies of selling citizenship. Other academics have looked at 
investment-based citizenship and residence schemes around the world and explored 
their impact on global inequality (Boatca 2015; Carrera 2014; Christians 2017; Xu et 
al. 2015;). While Džankić (2012) proposed a general classification of these 
programmes into 1) discretionary naturalisation on grounds of national interest; 2) 
investor citizenship; 3) golden residence programmes, a comprehensive typology of 
these programmes, which would allow broader comparisons, is yet to be developed. 
In general, immigrant investor programmes can be divided into two groups 
based on the purpose and outcome of policy for the state and for the investor: 1) 
investment-based residence programs (IRPs), linked to temporary or permanent 
residence rights; and 2) investment-based citizenship programs (ICPs), providing the 
applicant with full membership. In both cases, immigrant investor programs result in 
a legal status (resident or citizen) derived from a particular amount of financial assets 
the applicant has transferred to the destination country. Hence the typology for 
classifying immigrant investor programs has two dimensions: investment obligation 
and status obligation.   
Since the purpose of IIPs is to attract foreign capital to the destination country, 
the investment becomes central to the attribution of status. There are however major 
discrepancies as to how much investment different programmes require. In their 
studies, both Džankić (2015) and Parker (2016) noted that financial requirements 
range from several tens of thousands to ten million euros. Hence on the ‘investment 
obligation’ dimension, we can develop a scale of countries requiring: 1) very low 
investment (below 100,000 euros); 2) low investment (100,0000 euros or more, and 
below 0.5 million euros); 3) medium investment (0.5 million euros or more, but 
below 1 million euros); 4) high investment (1 million euros or more, but below 5 
million euros); 5) very high investment (over 5 million euros). In operationalizing this 
dimension, IIPs are ranked 1 to 5, as above. For example, the Greek programme, 
requiring an investment of 0.3 million euros will receive the score of 2, while the 
UK’s Tier 1 (Investor) visa with the required investment of 1 million GBP (1.12 
million euros, October 2017) will be at the fourth point of the scale. In countries 
where a single programme offers multiple options for investment in exchange for one 
status (e.g. Spain), only the minimum amount will be ranked. This ranking 
mechanism is based on the assumption that the lowest investment is a sufficient for 
obtaining status under the given programme. 
The outcome of all immigrant investor programmes is the conferral of a legal 
status (citizen or resident) to the investor. Each status is linked to a particular set of 
rights. Citizens are full members of a polity, whose rights normally include the 
franchise, social rights and consular protection, and are accompanied by the visa-free 
travel regime granted by the country’s passport. Foreign residents have the right to 
live or settle in a given country, but their voting rights are limited (usually to the local 
level). They are also required to undertake further actions aimed at securing the 
continuation of their resident status or at eventually obtaining citizenship.  
In the typology of IIPs, as noted by Parker (2016), it is essential to reflect on 
the balance between rights and obligations. Therefore, the ranking on the ‘status 
obligation’ dimension needs to reflect two key questions: 1) what obligations does the 
investor have to obtain citizenship rights?; and 2) what obligations does the investor 
have to maintain residence rights? This allows us to develop a 5-point scale, in which 
the obligations that an individual has to access and keep their status are ranked from 
lowest (1) to highest (5). The scale thus runs as follows: 1) citizenship rights obtained 
with no visit to the country; 2) citizenship rights obtained with registered residence 
but scarcely any physical presence is required; 3) registration of residence and 
multiannual continuous physical presence is required, but the programme results in 
citizenship;4 4) residence rights are maintained by registration, but limited physical 
presence is required and investors are subject to a special tax status; and 5) residence 
rights are maintained by registration, and physical presence of over 6 months and all 
regular taxes are payable. The logic of such a scale is that under the lowest status 
obligation (1), the investor obtains citizenship almost directly; under the highest one 
(5) he or she is bound by compulsory ordinary residence, which after multiple years 
might result in citizenship.  
Table 1 (below) offers a summary of these two dimensions through a general 
typology, which discusses some general characteristics of states that adopt a certain 
type of policies.  
[Table 1 near here] 
The typology is reliant on the status dimension, because the amount of the 
investment obligation reflects sizes and particular needs of different economies. Table 
1 (above) contracts the  ‘status obligation’ dimension into (1) ‘facilitated citizenship’ 
(status obligations 1, 2, 3 on the above scale); (2) ‘facilitated residence’ (status 
obligation 4) on the above scale); (3) ‘ordinary residence’ (status obligation 5 on the 
above scale).  
Programmes that facilitate the acquisition of citizenship alleviate significantly 
(or completely) the residence requirement in the form of an individual’s physical 
presence in the country. They are based on the idea of the benefits of a single 
pecuniary contribution, and target wealthy migrants who would not engage in 
political processes (‘long-distance citizens’). Hence in states running such 
programmes, the one-off investment makes a considerable impact on the economy 
and therefore such states are likely to be small or economically weak. Programmes 
that facilitate the acquisition and maintenance of residence rights through limited 
physical presence target individuals who are on the lookout for business opportunities 
in the destination country, but are detached from political processes (‘long-distance 
migrants’). Such states are likely to have specific economic needs, which are met 
through investment rather than human capital. Finally, programmes requiring 
investment and physical presence in exchange for residence rights seek to attract 
continuous engagement by individuals who are willing to take part in the destination 
country’s political life. States operating such programmes pursue an active and 
continuous economic contribution by prospective citizens (migrants). In the following 
sections, we operationalize the programmes in the EU along the five-point scale, and 
use the typology in Table 1 (above) to subsequently explore which environments are 
favourable to the development of different kinds of IIPs.  
 
Operationalising and classifying immigrant investor programs in the EU 
 
The landscape of European immigrant investor programmes reflects a variety of 
policies. The majority of the EU Member States can use the state’s prerogative to 
constitute its demos and decide on those who have ‘earned’ to be their nationals. They 
facilitate naturalisation on the basis of national interest or exceptional contribution to 
the state. Bauböck and Wallace-Goodman (2010, 7) highlighted that this type of 
naturalisation is not commonly used, and sometimes the number of new citizens is 
limited by law, e.g., not more than ten people annually in Estonia.5 In this context, the 
state has the discretion to equalize the investment with “national interest”, or 
“exceptional contribution” in the form of services rendered to the state. The data at 
the European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) on Citizenship indicate that out 
of the 28 Member States of the EU, 22 allow discretionary naturalization on grounds 
of special achievements, which may include, in addition to the economic interest, the 
cultural, sports or scientific one.6 In only 4 of them, namely Austria, Bulgaria, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, “economic” or “commercial” interest has been mentioned in 
the nationality law as grounds for facilitated naturalization. In 19 countries of the EU, 
provisions on naturalisation based on national interest do not explicitly mention 
economic contribution. Since the conferral of citizenship in such cases is fully 
discretionary and investment amounts are not specified, these legal provisions are 
excluded from the  analysis. 
 Rather, the analysis focuses on programmes in four EU Member States –
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, and Romania where clearly stipulated investment amounts 
can be assessed against the obligations investors have to meet to obtain citizenship 
rights. In addition to these four ICPs, the analysis also includes programmes in the EU 
member states that offer residence rights for investment or entrepreneurial activity. 
Specific programmes with defined investment amounts and conditions the applicant 
needs to meet in order to receive and maintain residence rights exist in eighteen 
countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 
Spain and the UK). These are analysed below, unlike the legislative provisions in 
Belgium, Germany,7 Italy Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, where residency through on 
investment is facilitated, but the details of the pecuniary contribution or the type of 
residence are not stipulated in laws.  
[Table 2 near here] 
Table 2 (above) gives an overview the legislative grounds, investment and 
status obligations in twenty-seven programmes existing in twenty-three European 
states, including the six programmes that could not be coded. A total of twenty one 
programmes have been coded along the lines presented in the previous section, 
allowing us to map the variety of different approaches to the relationship between 
investment and status obligations. These are best captured in Figure 1 (below) 
representing a graphic overview of all immigrant investor programmes in the EU. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
The data visualisation in Figure 1 (above) indicates that the lower left corner is 
empty (low investment, low status obligation) and that ICPs are located in the upper 
left third (high investment, low status obligation). This indicates that there are no 
programmes in EU that enable the conferral of citizenship in exchange for a very low 
or low investment. Rather, the four investment-based citizenship programmes require 
for high or very high investment amounts and limited physical presence. The six 
programmes in the centre offer facilitated residence rights (medium-high investment, 
medium-high status obligation). Programmes in countries that populate the right third 
require higher status obligations from investors and mandatory residence. 
Programmes located in the top offer residence rights in exchange for higher, and those 
bottom lower, investment amounts.  
The following section explores in more details characteristics of countries 
running immigrant investor programmes. In line with the typology presented in Table 
1, it identifies environments conducive to different relationships between investment 
and status obligations.    
 
Understanding immigrant investor programmes in the EU 
 
In the EU context, the regulation of free movement for citizens and third country 
nationals also influences policies geared towards investors. That is, citizenship of 
each Member State grants rights across the Union (article 20, TFEU), and residence 
rights in each Member State grant rights in that state and some rights (e.g. travel, or 
free movement for permanent residents) across the Union. The classification in the 
previous section highlights that ICPs in the EU are an exception rather than a rule, 
and that countries are more prone to introducing residence-based investor 
programmes. While the state’s discretion in deciding on membership is widely 
accepted, explicit programmes resulting in the sale of citizenship generate significant 
contention and high political costs, domestically and internationally (Carrera 2014; 
Johnston 2015). Residence-based programmes are more broadly accepted as they 
have the potential to generate multiannual tax revenues (Christians 2017). Non-
facilitated IRPs might also have lower political costs as their beneficiaries need to 
meet the same naturalisation conditions as ordinary applicants (Džankić 2015). 
This raises the question of what environments are conducive to ICPs and IRPs, 
and what can explain the differences in investment and status obligations among these 
programmes? To better understand this question, we will look in detail at the typology 
presented Table 1 and operationalized in Figure 1 (above). This will help us to discern 
some of the motivations of states in attracting ‘long distance citizens’, ‘long distance 
migrants’, or ordinary migrants through these programmes.  
 
Investment in exchange for citizenship rights: on the lookout for ‘long-distance 
citizens’ 
 
Programmes populating the lower right quadrant in Figure 1 (above) offer citizenship 
rights for a clearly specified amount of investment. In the EU, such investor 
citizenship exists in the four post-2004 countries - Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, and 
Romania. They are different in terms of investment and status obligations, which 
indicates that the purposes of these programs might as well differ.  
Having the highest investment obligation, Cyprus only performs due diligence 
and criminal record checks on applicants, resulting in a quicker procedure for 
obtaining citizenship. As of June 2017, this country also requires ‘permanent 
residence’, which is applied for concurrently with the citizenship request and is a 
procedural rather than an actual obligation (Decision of the Council of Ministers 
dated 19.3.2014; as amended in 2017). Malta, Bulgaria and Romania require lower 
investment, but have additional status-related conditions, including some form of 
residence, oath of allegiance, or language knowledge. In Bulgaria and Malta, the 
residence requirement is much lower than the one for ordinary naturalisation (e.g., 
one year for investors, ten years for other applicants). Substantial physical presence in 
the country is usually not required, (Dalli 2015) unlike in Romania, where it is set at 
four years (Act No. 21/1991 on Romanian citizenship, article 8).  
 Hence the objective of these programmes in Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta is 
different from that in Romania. The first three countries seek to attract one-off 
investment by wealthy elites who will not migrate to or become involved in the polity. 
In exchange for their pecuniary contribution, these ‘long distance citizens’ receive the 
benefits of EU citizenship, which is ‘the main generator of rights in the Union’ 
(Kochenov 2011, 338). By contrast, while eventually resulting in citizenship, the 
Romanian programme includes a substantial residence condition, and other criteria 
such as the knowledge of the language, culture and constitution. It thus does not aim 
at creating ‘long-distance citizens’ but rather individuals actively involved in the 
polity.  
 Yet, why do these countries pursue different kinds of future citizens and why 
do they require different investment amounts? Before exploring a range of interrelated 
factors, one needs to be aware of two caveats. First, the number of beneficiaries of 
such programmes is limited, due to the high pecuniary obligation. Second, if we 
assume that possessing the citizenship of one Member State generates rights across 
the EU, beneficiaries of one ICP are unlikely to be interested in obtaining another 
country’s citizenship by investment. Hence the pool of potential applicants becomes 
smaller with each granted passport.  
Cyprus and Malta are two small Mediterranean islands, Commonwealth 
members, with high-income and service-based economies. With a GDP per capita of 
22,600 USD, Malta requires an investment of 1.15 million euros; and Cyprus with 
23,300 USD requires 2.5 million euros minimum investment (World Bank 2017). 
However, the difference in the required investment amounts in Malta and Cyprus 
cannot be fully explained only by looking at the amount of GDP per capita. They 
might also reflect the size of these countries. Given that the population of Cyprus is 
847,000 and that of Malta 429,300 (Eurostat 2016), an investment of 2.5 million in 
Cyprus is likely to have similar economic effects on the GDP per capita as that of 
1.15 million in Malta.  
Equally, the small size of these countries might indicate that they are more 
interested in investment than in human capital. The likely reason for this is that in 
small countries, political balances are delicate. Since electoral outcomes are usually 
decided by margins of several thousand votes, general naturalisation rules are 
commonly strict (EUDO Citizenship 2016). They pose a barrier to the formation of 
large immigrant populations that could affect political outcomes. Naturalisation 
conditions are relaxed for investors because they are likely to be few and detached 
from political processes.  
Bulgaria and Romania are post-communist upper-middle-income industrial 
economies. Bulgaria whose GDP per capita has been just over 7,000 USD requires the 
lowest investment amount of 0.53 million euros; Romania with the GDP per capita of 
9,000 USD and investment of 1 million euros (World Bank 2017). The two countries 
are also considerably larger than Malta and Cyprus. Bulgaria has a population of 7.2 
million and Romania of 19.86 (Eurostat 2016). Hence investments of these amounts 
are likely to have smaller impacts on the economies of Bulgaria and Romania than on 
those of Malta and Cyprus. Bulgaria introduced its ICP in 2013 and Romania in 2009, 
likely due to the effects of the global financial crisis, which significantly reduced the 
amounts of foreign direct investment in these countries (World Bank 2017).  
Yet unlike Romania, which conditions the conferral of citizenship with a four-
year residence and integration, Bulgaria requires scarce presence of investors on its 
soil. This might indicate that the primary purpose of the programme in Bulgaria is to 
re-capitalise the country’s economy, while that in Romania might be related to 
attracting human capital. Engagement in the polity does not feature as an explanatory 
factor for the absence of the status obligation in Bulgaria and its existence in 
Romania. Given the large size of these countries, and the low number of investor 
citizens, ICP beneficiaries are unlikely to significantly affect political and electoral 
outcomes.  
In sum, both small and large countries might seek to attract ‘long-distance 
citizens’, but the investment needs to have an effect on the country’s GDP. In small 
countries, further common elements of environments conducive to these programmes 
include geographical isolation (island states), Commonwealth membership, and 
service-oriented high-income economies. In large countries, such common elements 
would include middle-income economies based on industry, as well as the experience 
of transitioning from communism to capitalism. While the sample of four countries in 
the EU is not conducive to major generalisations, research (Džankić 2012; GRIR 
2016) has indicated that indeed, ICPs emerge mostly in small island states, such as 
Antigua and Barbuda, Comoros, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Vanuatu, etc. 
 
Investment in exchange for facilitated residence rights: attracting ‘long-distance 
migrants’ 
 
Figure 1 (above) indicates that Cyprus, Greece,8 Malta, Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
offer facilitated residence rights in exchange for a pecuniary contribution directed 
towards a specific sector. Neither of these countries requires investors to be physically 
present on their soil for extended periods of time and they all facilitate tax obligations 
for non-habitual residents. In regards to the latter, Christians (2017, 3) notes that 
‘governments increasingly appear to view their tax systems as a means of potentially 
increasing the value of residence and citizenship in their countries’. In this sense, 
states operating these programmes compete for ‘long distance migrants’ who are 
fiscal residents, not actively engaged in the polity. 
 Cyprus offers facilitated permanent residence to investors, conditioned with 
one visit to the country. The programme is linked to the country’s favourable tax 
climate, whereby non-domiciled residents pay a progressive tax on their worldwide 
income, but are exempt from domestic taxes such as the defence contribution (17 per 
cent) and tax on passive interest income (30 per cent) (Kälin 2016).  
Greece, Malta, Ireland, Portugal and Spain offer temporary residence permits, 
with little obligation of physical presence.9 In Greece, Malta, Ireland and Spain, the 
applicant is required to prove that they have travelled to these countries or visited 
them during the validity of their residence permit. In Portugal, for residence permit 
renewal purposes, applicants may be asked to deliver evidence that they have resided 
in the country for 7 days in the first year and 14 days in the subsequent two year 
periods (article 5, Order n. 1661-A/2013). In addition to relaxing the physical 
residence requirement, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Spain and Portugal also have a 
facilitated tax regime for investors, who are considered non-habitual residents. These 
countries differentiate between ‘residence’ and ‘tax residence’, whereby only those 
present on the country’s soil for over 183 days are subject to the regular tax regime. 
For instance, holders of Malta’s residence permit but who are not physically present 
in the country for more than 183 days are taxed for Malta-based capital gains and on a 
remittance basis for foreign income. In a similar fashion, since 2015 Spain allows 
investors to become non-habitual residents subject to a 19% tax on Spain-based 
income as of 1 January 2016. This policy option has been influenced by Portugal, 
where investors benefit from a non-habitual resident tax status, with a 20% tax (3.5% 
surcharge as of 2015) on Portugal-based income. Ireland taxes non-habitual residents 
only for Ireland-based income and has a corporate tax rate of 12.5% (Deloitte 2017). 
In Greece, non-habitual residents are taxed for their Greece-based income starting at 
22% (Deloitte 2017).  
Spain and Portugal offer investors the possibility for naturalisation after ten 
and six years of such facilitated residence, respectively. Ireland grants only residence 
rights to investors through this programme, but physical presence is required for 
naturalisation. In Greece, the permit obtained through investment grants facilitated 
residence rights, but this residence does not count towards citizenship or EU long-
term resident status (Law 4251 on Immigration and Social Integration Code and other 
provisions, article 20). In all of these countries, third country nationals who are not 
investors can lose their residence rights if they are absent from the country for 
substantial periods of time (usually six months). 
The common characteristic of environments in which such programmes 
emerge is that, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta, they are medium-sized 
economies in which particular sectors (e.g., real estate) have been particularly 
affected by the financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis (Parker 2016). 
These programmes do not target migrants, but rather individuals who will contribute 
to the fiscal system through taxes or to the vulnerable aspects of the country’s 
economy. In Cyprus and Malta, where these programmes can be integrated in 
citizenship by investment schemes, the key objective is to attract a one-off or short-
term influx of capital. In other countries, a continuous and maintained financial 
investment on behalf of the applicant is required for maintaining residence rights and 
eventually obtaining citizenship.  
 
 
Investment in exchange for ordinary residence rights: attracting wealth and 
participation 
 
The top two quadrants in Figure 1 (above) are reserved for countries that exchange 
residence rights for investment. The upper part of both left and right quadrants 
indicate that countries seek migrants, who will also be participants and stakeholders in 
their destination countries. A total of 11 countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, France, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania and the UK) 
currently offer residence rights for clearly stipulated investment amounts. Their IRPs 
enable applicants obtain temporary but renewable residence permits, which would 
subsequently set them on the track to permanent residence or citizenship.  
In addition to these programmes, Hungary used to offer permanent residence 
until 31 March 2017. The Hungarian IRP has been suspended due to controversies 
over its transparency (Nagy 2016). Under the Hungarian programme, an investment 
of 300,000 euros (originally 250,000 euros) qualified investors for a settlement visa, 
which enables foreign nationals to stay in Hungary for an indefinite period of time 
and spend 3 out of six months in other Schengen countries.10 The grounds for the 
programme were adopted in 2007, during the rule of the Hungarian Socialist Party. In 
2012, detailed IRP rules were proposed by Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance, 
primarily as a mechanism of regulating the status of Chinese nationals investing in the 
country. Antal Rogán, one of the Fidesz parliamentarians who proposed the bill, 
corroborated that while the IRP could be used for settlement of all foreigners, it 
originated in negotiations with China through the Chinese-Hungarian Friendship 
Association (Hungarian Parliament 2012, 284-332). The combination of Chinese 
single citizenship policy and the lobbying of commercial law firms led to Hungary’s 
preference of a permanent IRP, rather than temporary permit or citizenship by 
investment (EMN Focused Study 2014, 8). While suspended at present, programme 
might reopen in 2018, subject to approval of the country’s Parliament. 
 Other EU Member States run temporary IRPs with high status obligations, 
whereby to maintain residence rights investors are bound to be present on the 
countries’ soil. However, the pecuniary contribution in temporary IRPs ranges from 
65,000 euros in Estonia to 10 million euros in France. Even so, we can observe 
several trends regarding the investment amounts. First, post-communist countries 
generally require lower pecuniary contributions. Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Romania grant residence rights in exchange for investments 
below 100,000 euros, while Bulgaria requires the minimum investment of 127,000 
euros. GDPs per capita of these countries are all below 18,000 USD (World Bank 
2017). Second, France, the Netherlands and the UK, which are large EU economies 
with GDPs per capita over 36,000 USD (World Bank 2017), require significantly 
higher investment amounts. These range from 1.17 million euros (1 million GBP) in 
the UK, to 1.25 million in the Netherlands, to 10 million in France.  
 This division indicates that countries offering ordinary residence in exchange 
for investment are on the lookout for migrants who will also be active participants in 
the polity. In all of these countries, the physical residence requirement is meant to 
create a link between the investor and the destination country, not the least by paying 
taxes, but also through socialising. The different investment amounts reflect the sizes 
and conditions of individual European economies – with major economies requiring 
multi-million, multi-annual investments; and minor, post-2004 economies, and the 
severely crisis-struck Greece, require comparatively lower investment, or investment 





In exploring contemporary migration, it is important to consider the development of 
policies targeting population linked to transnational, supranational and subnational 
political spaces. Immigrant investor programs are one of the lenses that can provide a 
fresh look on the questions of membership in the contemporary world. These 
programmes are different from other immigration policies, because they target a 
limited number of beneficiaries. Immigrant investor programs seek to attract the 
beneficiary (or his or her capital) to the state as opposed to many other immigration 
policies, which restrict the conditions of entry and stay of immigrants (e.g., family 
reunification, refugees).  
The purpose of this paper was to classify the immigrant investor programs on 
grounds of the relationship between the required investment and status obligations. 
While there are commonly a number of conditions an individual needs to meet in 
order to become a citizen of a given country, the residence criterion is the most 
important one and has been used as a proxy for the typology. The reason for this is 
that by mandatory residence, an individual is likely to integrate in the country, learn 
the language, establish social ties, and make it the nexus of his or her life. Hence by 
taking into account the dimensions of investment and status, the typology developed 
in this paper helps to understand what kind of citizens or residents states seek to 
attract. Programmes requiring higher investment amounts and little to none physical 
presence have as their objective a short-term inflow of funds and ‘long-distance 
citizens’. Similarly, programmes that facilitate residence rights in exchange for 
investment target ‘long-distance migrants’ who will contribute to their economy 
without engaging in political processes. They differ from programmes that exchange 
ordinary residence rights for investment, which target migrants who will offer a 
continuous input in the respective country’s economy and politics.  
The immigrant investor programs in the EU are exemplary of these dynamics, 
especially in the context of the freedom of movement in the EU and the rights of EU 
citizenship. The analysis in this paper reveals that while Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta and 
Romania all run ICPs, the first three countries have scarcely any residence 
requirement while Romania requires four years. This indicates that programmes in 
Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta target investment, as opposed to Romania, which also 
pursues human capital. Additionally, programmes in five countries offer the 
possibility for investors to obtain residence rights without extensive physical 
presence. Analysis indicates that this quest for ‘long-distance migrants’ is likely to be 
caused by acute economic needs of these countries, most of which have been 
adversely affected by the economic crisis. Finally, programmes in 11 EU countries 
offer residence rights to investors, but require them to be physically present on their 
soil for over 6 months per year. The goal of these programmes is to attract engaged 
entrepreneurial migrants rather than a single inflow of funds.  
In conclusion, this paper has offered a general a typology of immigrant 
investor programs, and applied it to the case of the EU member states. It is expected 
that this typology will facilitate further normative and comparative studies of 
investment-based migration. Given the salience of this topic and the increasing 
number of investor citizenship programmes worldwide, a major avenue is opened in 
citizenship and immigration studies to examine the instrumental uses of membership 
statuses, as well as strategies that direct and indirect beneficiaries pursue through 
immigrant investor programmes.  
 
																																																								
1 The Hungarian Investment Immigration Program was indefinitely put on hold on 31 March 2017. 
However, it is included in this analysis as it has been developed in the second wave of contemporary 
IIPs in the EU. Subject to parliamentary approval, the programme might reopen in 2018.  
2 In both cases, beneficiaries will include almost exclusively third country nationals (TCNs), as EU 
citizens and permanent residents already enjoy free movement rights. 
3 The only exception to this rule is currently Greece, in which capital controls are in place.  
4 This type of programmes is very rare, nonetheless existent in some countries such as Romania. It has 
been ranked on the third point of the scale since the acquisition of citizenship is facilitated. Even 
though residence is mandatory, it is lower than in cases of ordinary naturalisation. In the fourth point of 
the scale, residence is facilitated but the number of years for naturalisation is unchanged.  
5 Eurostat (2015) and national statistical offices of the EU’s Member States provide no information on 
the exact numbers of discretionary naturalisation broken down by grounds for admission. 
6 The citizenship laws of the Denmark, Finland, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom do 
not contain provisions on naturalisation on grounds of special achievements. EUDO CITIZENSHIP 
(2016). Global Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizenship. San Domenico di Fiesole: European 
University Institute. Available at: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/global-modes-of-acquisition. See 
information under “Mode A24, Special Achievements”. 
7 Until August 2012, Germany offered an investor residence scheme to applicants who invested 
250,000 euros and created 10 jobs. Amendments to article 21 of the German Residence Act abolished 
the minimum thresholds for investment, but retained an entrepreneurial program, granting a higher 
discretion to the authorities to decide on the economic priorities of the state. 
8 The 2005 programme offered ordinary residence rights in Greece, while the 2014 offers facilitated 
residence with minimum requirements of physical presence.  
9 The original programme adopted by Spain required beneficiaries of the programme to be physically 
present in the country for over six months. The 2015 amendments, aimed at making the Spanish 
programme compared to the Portuguese one abolished this requirement. 
10 After five years of continuous and legal residence with this permit, investors are entitled to apply for 
an EU Long Term Residence (LTR), provided that they are not absent Hungary for six consecutive 
months (and less than ten months in the five-year period). This entitles them to EU-wide rights, 
including free movement of workers and social benefits (Council Directive 2003/109/EC).  
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